Source: World Health Organization
Country: Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, …
Message from our Regional Director
Despite numerous humanitarian challenges in 2017 in Africa, there were also a number of heart-warming accomplishments. A case in point, was when a local response of Red Crescent teams—and other partners—curbed Somalia’s cholera outbreak through the power of local volunteers and shared international expertise. In terms of support to our members, 36 National Societies were able to kick start initiatives that built their capacity through seed grants.
It is such highlights that I am pleased to present in this annual report for 2017, a year during which the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Africa continued to pursue the direction and specific milestones defined in the “IFRC in Africa, Road Map 2017 – 2020.” The humanitarian context in 2017 remained challenging. A food crisis continued to worsen in Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, north-east Nigeria and Central African Republic (CAR). The refugee crisis in Uganda was compounded by a new influx of thousands of people fleeing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Madagascar, an outbreak of pneumonic plague killed over 100 people. In the same year, Cyclone Enawo, the strongest storm to hit Madagascar in over a decade, left enormous humanitarian needs in its wake.
Perhaps one of the most dreadful humanitarian disasters of the year was when deadly mudslides killed over 1,000 people in a very short time on the outskirts Freetown, Sierra Leone, leaving about 8,000 families of survivors in need of humanitarian assistance.
Our gallant volunteers responded to all of these challenges with unerring courage and determination. Sadly, it was not without a price: several volunteers lost their lives in line of duty in 2017. Six Red Cross volunteers were killed in an attack on a health centre in southeast Central African Republic on 3 August.
That was the third attack on Red Cross workers in Central African Republic that year. In January 2017, in Nigeria, six Red Cross aid workers were killed in an airstrike on the town of Rann, near the border of Nigeria and Cameroon.
My experience as the IFRC Regional Director for Africa continues to be immeasurably rewarding. The commitment of the network of African Red Cross and Red Crescent staff, volunteers and partners in response to the needs of vulnerable communities has inspired me to be deeply committed to the Movement. It is humbling to see the greatest strength of African National Societies – the volunteers – at work. The 1.4 million volunteers in Africa who selflessly offer unparalleled presence at local level. They help us to respond fast, and to go the extra mile.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to Red Cross Red Crescent staff and volunteers and IFRC colleagues who made 2017 a successful, if challenging, year. Their dedication and hard work has ensured we’ve reached millions across the region. This report provides useful insights and inspiration for taking humanitarian work in Africa to the next level.
Dr Fatoumata Nafo-Traoré Regional Director, IFRC Africa
United Nations-coordinated Appeals
FUNDING REQUIRED $25.20B
FUNDING RECEIVED $11.97B
UNMET REQUIREMENTS $13.23B
PEOPLE IN NEED 135.3 M
PEOPLE TO RECEIVE AID 97.9 M
COUNTRIES AFFECTED 41
Global Humanitarian Funding
FUNDING RECEIVED $17.98B
UN-COORDINATED APPEALS $11.97B
OTHER FUNDING $6.01B
Global Appeal Status
At the end of October 2018, 21 Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) and the Syria Regional Response Plan (3RP) require US$25.20 billion to assist 97.9 million people in urgent need of humanitarian support. The plans are funded at $11.97 billion; this amounts to 47.5 per cent of financial requirements for 2018. Requirements are lower than in September 2018 due to revision of the Ethiopia Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan (HDRP). For the remainder of 2018, humanitarian organizations require another $13.23 billion to meet the needs outlined in these plans.
Global requirements are $1.10 billion higher than at this time last year. Overall coverage and the dollar amount were only marginally higher in late October than at the same time in 2017.
On 8 October the Government of Ethiopia and humanitarian partners issued a Mid-Year Review of the HDRP. The revised plan reflects changes in the humanitarian context, and requires $1.49 billion for 2018, as opposed to the March 2018 requirement of $1.6 billion to reach some 7.88 million people in need of food or cash relief assistance and 8.49 million people with non-food assistance in the course of the year. Despite the general good performance of this year’s belg (spring) rains, the number of people targeted for relief food and cash support remains largely unchanged due to the significant spike in internal displacement since April 2018.
Security Council Briefings and High Level Missions
At a briefing to the Security Council on 23 October, Under-Secretary-General/Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) Mark Lowcock called on all stakeholders to do everything possible to avert catastrophe in Yemen. In a follow up note on the humanitarian situation in Yemen of 30 October, the USG/ERC thanked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Kuwait, the United Kingdom and all donors for the record amount raised for the humanitarian appeal in 2018 which had meant nearly 8 million people had received assistance across the country; more than 7 million people had received food and more than 420,000 children been treated for malnutrition; clean water, sanitation and basic hygiene support is now available to 7.4 million people and about 8 million men, women, girls and boys had benefited from health services.
At a Security Council briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria on 29 October, the USG/ERC urged the Security Council and key Member States to ensure that the ceasefire holds in Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib to prevent a military onslaught and overwhelming humanitarian suffering. He thanked donors for the $1.7 billion contributed so far towards the HRP for Syria, but pointed out that this HRP is currently funded at less than 50 per cent.
In her statement to the Security Council on 30 October, Assistant Under-Secretary-General/Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator (ASG/DERC)
Ursulla Mueller spoke of the steady decline in humanitarian funding for the Ukraine over the years and mentioned that the HRP for 2018 is funded at only 32 per cent. This is simply not enough to cover food, health care, water, sanitation and other life-saving assistance. ASG/DERC Mueller appealed to donors to increase their support for consolidating gains in anticipation of the fast-approaching winter.
During a joint mission to Chad and Nigeria (5-7 October) with UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner, as part of a series of country visits the two will make to advance humanitarian-development collaboration, the USG/ERC called on donors to fulfil pledges and announcements of over $2 million made in Berlin last month at the High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region (3-4 September). He noted the importance of maintaining humanitarian response in the region as needs were still very high.
Following her visit to the Republic of the Philippines from 9 to 11 October, ASG/DERC Mueller announced that OCHA would continue advocating for sustained funding to address humanitarian needs of people displaced by the Marawi conflict while ensuring that support for the transition to longerterm and sustainable recovery is forthcoming.
- The Global Humanitarian Overview 2019 and World Humanitarian Data and Trends will be launched in the course of joint event to take place in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on 4 December 2018.
Between January and the end of October 2018, country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) have received a total of $708 million in contributions from 32 donors (including contributions through the UN Foundation). During the same period, a total of $616 million from the 18 operational funds was allocated towards 1,071 projects with 575 implementing partners. Nearly 40 per cent ($246 million) of the funds were allocated to international NGOs and some 26 per cent (approximately $160 million) to national NGOs. UN agencies received 32 per cent ($202 million) of the allocated funds and Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations received over 1 per cent (some $8 million) of all allocated funds. The largest allocations per sector went to health; food security; water, sanitation and hygiene; nutrition; emergency shelter and NFIs.
Between 1 January and 31 October 2018, the Emergency Relief Coordinator approved $477 million in grants from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to support life-saving activities in 45 countries. This includes $297.7 million from the Rapid Response Window and $179.7 million from the Underfunded Emergencies (UFE) Window. A total of $31.6 million in Rapid Response grants was approved in October in response to cholera outbreaks in Zimbabwe, Niger and Nigeria; flooding in Laos; and the population influx from Venezuela to Brazil, Ecuador and Peru; as well as to support Government relief efforts following the earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The UFE 2018 second round was completed this month, with $30.6 million approved in September and the remaining $49.4 million of the round’s $80 million released in October to assist people caught up in nine chronic emergencies in Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya,
Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Sudan.
Funding for humanitarian activities in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is at an all-time low. Nearly all agencies requesting financial support through the HRP have received less funding in 2018 than in previous years. This leaves humanitarian partners ill-placed to meet emerging needs or respond to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where the rise in casualties during the recent demonstrations has stretched Gaza’s overburdened health system.
Humanitarian agencies appealed in August for $43.8 million to respond to the Gaza crisis, particularly trauma management and emergency health care, in 2018. On 22 September, the Humanitarian Coordinator for the oPt launched an $8.3 million allocation from the oPt Humanitarian Fund to implement critical HRP projects, mainly in Gaza. Stocks of medical supplies are in extremely short supply and depleted to almost half of requirements. Since late October, the Gaza power plant has been providing up to eleven hours of electricity a day. However, around 250 health,
WASH and essential solid waste facilities continue to rely on UN-procured emergency fuel for running back-up generators. This year’s intensive operations have depleted funds and stocks and the $1 million allocated by the oPt Humanitarian Fund for fuel supplies will only last until the end of November. Further and urgent financial support is therefore required.
Conditions in Yemen continued to deteriorate in October, pushing the country to the brink of famine. On 23 October, the USG/ERC warned the Security Council that without urgent action, up to 14 million people – half the population – could face pre-famine conditions in the coming months.
Assessments are currently under way, with initial results expected in mid-November. The economic crisis is raising the risk of famine. The Yemeni rial has depreciated by nearly 50 per cent over the last year. Commodity prices have soared, as Yemen imports 90 per cent of staple food and nearly all fuel and medicine.
Urgent steps are required to avert immediate catastrophe. First, a cessation of hostilities is needed; this is especially critical in populated areas.
Second, imports of food, fuel and other essentials must be able to enter Yemen without impediment. Roads must remain open so these goods can reach communities across the country. Third, the Yemeni economy must be supported, including by injecting foreign exchange, expediting credit for imports and paying salaries and pensions. Fourth, international funding must increase now to allow humanitarians to meet growing needs for assistance. Finally, all parties must engage with the UN Special Envoy to end the conflict. Yemen remains the largest humanitarian operation in the world, with more than 200 partners working through the Yemen HRP.
• In Q1-2018, the FAO cereal price index rose by 8.6 percent from Q1-2017, while the global food price index declined by 2 percent year-on-year.
• The real price for wheat was 22 percent above Q1-2017 levels: crops suffered dryness in the United States and cold weather in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, leaving production forecasts open to a downward revision.3 World ending stocks remain at record levels.
• The real price for maize was 6 percent higher than last quarter but stable compared to Q1-2017.
Overall favourable crop conditions offset mixed production outcomes in the southern African regions, leading to firm world supplies.
• The real price of rice increased by 14 percent from Q1-2017, with a slight contraction of stocks in exporting countries and increased buying interest from importing countries.
• In Q1, the real price of crude oil increased by 5 percent from the previous quarter following an agreement on extensive production cuts in major oil-producing countries.
• The cost of the basic food basket increased severely (>10%) in Q1-2018 in five countries: Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Rwanda, the Sudan and Yemen. High increases (5–10%) were seen in Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, Turkey and Viet Nam. In the other monitored countries, the change was moderate or low (<5%).
• Price spikes, as monitored by ALPS, were detected in 19 countries, particularly in Burkina Faso, Haiti, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and the Sudan (see the map below).4 These spikes indicate crisis levels for the two most important staples in each country, which could be maize, milk, millet, oil, rice, sorghum, sweet potatoes or wheat.
This 4Mi snapshot is a continuation of the snapshot published in September 2018 on profiles and reasons for departure of refugees and migrants from West Africa. It is also based on data collected between 1 January and 31 July 2018.
During this period, 2,184 refugees and migrants were interviewed by 4Mi in West Africa, in Mali (Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu), Niger (Niamey and Agadez) and Burkina Faso (Dori and Bobo Dioulasso).
Par le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique
19 octobre 2018
Les conflits sont un facteur central de la géographie de l’insécurité alimentaire en Afrique. Plus un conflit se poursuit, plus l’acuité de cette insécurité s’aggrave.
Les conflits en Afrique continuent d’apporter une contribution majeure aux problèmes de sécurité alimentaire du continent. Les violences continues perturbent l’agriculture, les moyens de subsistance et le fonctionnement des marchés, affaiblissant la résilience des ménages face à la sécheresse et à d’autres pressions. Les conflits limitent également les mouvements, empêchant certaines communautés d’accéder à l’aide humanitaire. Une évaluation des zones d’insécurité alimentaire aiguë en Afrique révèle ces conclusions:
Les trois quarts des Africains sont en situation d’insécurité alimentaire aiguë, en état de crise ou d’urgence – plus de 107 millions sur un total de 143 millions – vivent dans des pays touchés par un conflit.
11 des 12 pays africains en conflit sont en situation d’insécurité alimentaire aiguë.
Les niveaux d’urgence de l’insécurité alimentaire dans de grandes parties du Soudan du Sud et du nord-est du Nigéria sont presque entièrement dus aux perturbations causées par le conflit.
Plus de la moitié de la population de 4 pays africains (Soudan du Sud, Cameroun, Burundi et République centrafricaine) connaît une insécurité alimentaire aiguë. Tous sont en conflit. Au Soudan du Sud, près de 80% de la population est en situation d’insécurité alimentaire extrême.
Plus de 15 millions de citoyens de 3 pays africains (Nigeria, Soudan et Cameroun) sont confrontés à une insécurité alimentaire aiguë. Chacun de ces pays connaît des conflits.
Les conflits africains non résolus tendent à amplifier les crises de sécurité alimentaire au fil du temps. Les conflits dans les 4 pays connaissant des niveaux de sécurité alimentaire préoccupante se poursuivent depuis 5 ans et demi en moyenne. En revanche, les conflits dans les 7 pays confrontés à une crise ou à une situation d’urgence en matière de sécurité alimentaire persistent depuis 14,7 années en moyenne.
31 travailleurs humanitaires ont été tués en Afrique, dont 11 dans le seul Soudan du Sud, entre janvier et juin 2018. 54 ont été enlevés et 40 ont été arrêtés.
Clarifying the roles of the African Union (AU) and subregional organisations is a central element of the AU reforms. It is key in terms of managing expectations about what the AU can or cannot do, as well as coordinating Africa’s responses to avoid duplication of efforts. But this issue is also divisive, and it is unclear whether AU member states will reach a concrete decision on a division of labour at the upcoming extraordinary summit on reforms in Addis Ababa on 17 November.
The AU Constitutive Act and other legal documents, including the Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol, envisage the AU as playing a leadership role in addressing challenges on the continent. Article 3(l) of the Constitutive Act mandates the AU to ‘coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union’.
However, none of the core documents of the various regional economic communities and mechanisms (RECs/RMs), which emerged through different processes, refers to the primacy of the AU. In the area of peace and security, for instance, RECs/RMs claim parallel responsibilities in terms of leading peace processes.
An analysis of the major security concerns on the continent shows that subregional organisations are increasingly at the forefront of addressing security threats.
A diminishing role in peace and security?
Out of 10 major security situations mentioned in the January 2018 decisions of the AU Assembly, the AU is only taking a clear leading role in two: the military intervention in Somalia and the mediation to end the ongoing border dispute between Sudan and South Sudan.
On the other hand, subregional organisations and ad-hoc regional groupings are leading mediations in South Sudan, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, as well as military interventions against terrorist groups in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and Central Africa. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also leads the political mediation in Somalia, alongside the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has taken the lead in the situations in Lesotho and Madagascar.
Yet, in some instances there is strong cooperation between subregions and the AU and United Nations (UN). One such example is the attempt to address the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR).
Finding solutions at the subregional level is in line with the 2008 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the AU and subregional organisations and mechanisms. However, the memorandum is not clear on what role the AU should play in conflict situations.
Should the AU be restricted to norm-setting?
In July 2018 the reform team led by President Paul Kagame produced a draft paper on the division of labour between the AU and RECs – a paper seen by the PSC Report.
The paper suggests that ‘the AU should set the strategic direction, develop harmonized continental agendas, policies, texts, standards, coordination, lead resource mobilization for continental actions and be responsible for monitoring, evaluation and accountability’.
RECs/RMs are expected to be responsible for the actual implementation of AU decisions, including enforcing member states’ compliance with AU norms. This resonates with a 2010 assessment of APSA that notes that ‘some RECs/RMs are of the view that the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency; it should rather play more of a coordination role’.
This would entail that the AU would act as a norm-setter, which in itself is not an easy task, given the security challenges and the diversity of governance standards on the continent. To be successful in setting norms, the AU will have to make sure these norms and policies are respected.
Therefore, while implementation at the subregional level is important, the AU should be empowered to provide checks and balances, especially when peace processes led by subregional organisations are compromised.
AU’s role when subregional peace processes fail
The CAR, South Sudan and DRC conflict situations show the deep involvement of neighbouring states in such crises. They are often accused of taking sides and arming or harbouring parties to the conflict. This raises concerns about the role of neighbouring countries in crises.
For instance, while IGAD’s mediation in South Sudan has recently seen some progress, South Sudan’s neighbours have been caught up in the conflict itself. Uganda supports President Salva Kiir’s government and sent troops in support of Kiir’s forces from 2013 to 2015, when the peace deal was signed. Sudan is accused of supporting South Sudan’s rebel groups.
Such concerns led UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to warn IGAD and neighbouring states against taking sides in South Sudan’s conflict.
It took a lot of international pressure for South Sudan’s neighbours to commit to the peace process, particularly after the resurgence of violence in July 2016. At the same time, these neighbours also blocked efforts to impose punitive measures on South Sudan elites.
An IGAD communiqué on 30 July 2018, for instance, argued that, ‘given the latest developments in the peace process and the need to implement the permanent ceasefire and achieve an inclusive peace agreement, it is not helpful to pursue punitive measures at this stage’. The meeting and communiqué came prior to a meeting by the AU Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan on 30 July as well as a PSC meeting on 31 July, thereby discouraging any considerations of punitive measures.
Even though a new deal has been reached with the support of Sudan and Uganda, the lack of an international enforcement plan in the agreement raises doubts about its sustainability. South Sudan’s warring parties have violated several other agreements in the past. What stops parties to the conflict from violating the current deal? Indeed, violence is ongoing in several parts of the country despite the peace deal.
As such, AU reformers have to explore options to enable the AU to take over peace initiatives led by subregional organisations when the latter’s efforts are compromised.
When subregional actors are unwilling or unable to address security threats
In some conflict situations, such as those in Libya and Cameroon, subregional organisations tend to be unwilling and/or unable to address the security threats.
In Cameroon, for instance, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is unwilling to put the issue either on its agenda or on the agenda of the AU. Most member states of ECCAS are led by like-minded elites who want to stay in power. This situation is complicated by the fact that ECCAS is a relatively weak REC when compared to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC, and its member states are facing internal issues of their own.
Given that the AU often takes its cue from subregions before intervening, the AU Assembly and the PSC have not been proactive in considering solutions to the crisis in the anglophone part of Cameroon. The issue continues to be viewed as an internal affair, despite the fact that over 400 people have died.
Such situations present instances where the AU should step up and lead the peace process while co-opting subregional actors and the international community.
Indeed, for the AU to be relevant to the lives of ordinary citizens and its member states, the continental body has to do more than set norms and evaluate implementation. This includes taking proactive steps in situations where member states are unwilling or unable to respond to security threats.
Such a proactive role requires a substantive review of the MoU between the AU and subregional organisations and mechanisms to clarify responsibilities and highlight situations that require AU intervention.